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This paper analyzes "The Stability and Growth Pact" for 
countries joining the Economic Monetary Union (EMU) in 
Europe. In the EMU, the member states face a credibility 
problem in terms of fiscal policy, to induce inflation. The 
Fiscal Theory of Price Determination suggests that 
government deficit and excessive debt cause actual and 
expected high inflation, and that fiscal restraint, such as The 
Stability and Growth Pact, is needed to sustain low inflation. 
However, most Western European countries in EMU face 
severe unemployment problems, which are caused by labor 
market institutions and others. The short run unemployment 
problems there depend on the aggregate demand induced 
by fiscal policy. This is inconsistent with the rule of fiscal 
constraint in the EMU. This paper investigates the effect of 
fiscal restraint on inflation and unemployment under the 
EMU, where monetary policy is conducted by the European 
Central Bank, and fiscal policy is determined by each 
government. The Stability and Growth Pact is effective for 
keeping inflation low, but may give rise to unemployment in 
member states. 
Keywords: European Monetary Union, Monetary and Fiscal policy, 
Labor Market Reform, The Growth and Stability Pact 
JEL classification: F33, F42 
1. Introduction: Fiscal discipline and the monetary integration 
In January 1999, the Euro was introduced in a limited form as a 
currency unit. Accordingly, the European Central Bank (ECB) had the 
effect of unifying each member states'economy regarding the 
monetary policy in Euro-Area. A uniform monetary policy in the EMU 
provides stability against an EMU-wide shock, but not against a 
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country specific shock. According traditional Keynesian theory, country 
specific shocks can be absorbed by the fiscal policy of each member 
state. 
Simultaneously, budgetary discipline was adopted by the member 
states to restrain the strong political bias of the governments in the 
member countries. According to the political business cycle theory, the 
preference of the government depends on the results of elections, 
which are in turn affected by fiscal expenditure stimulating aggregate 
demand and employment. Therefore, the government tends to run 
excessive deficits and debts in order for the government in power to 
win the vote, which causes a bias in the economy. Fiscal restraint 
guarantees avoidance of this political bias. 
Figure 1 shows the situation of EU deficits and debts, 1970-1997. 
Positive output gaps occurred three times in this period, while EU 
member states have reacted prudently to severe recessions to loosen 
discretionary fiscal policy in other periods. Even in "good periods" with 
positive output gaps, EU member states loosened their fiscal policy, 
not to reverse the policy. The loose fiscal policy resulted in continuous 
accumulation of the government debt of EU member states in this 
period. For this reason, fiscal restraint in EU member states was 
suggested such as the Maastricht criteria. 
Figure 1 EU deficits and debt, 1970-1997 
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The fiscal theory of price determination (FTPD) emphasizes 
restraining government budget deficit such as the Stability and Growth 
Pact (Stability Pact herein after). Under the FTPD, fiscal expansion is 
the most important factor of inflation. The Maastricht Treaty as 
preparatory for Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) requires lower 
%or lower inflation rates (3% or lower) and restricted fiscal conditions 
(3% or lower of the deficit per GDP, and 60% or lower of the debt per 
GDP). These criteria are based on neo-classical macroeconomic 
theory, such as the FTPD. Indeed, neo-classical macroeconomics 
might apply to analysis in the mid-or long-term, but not in the short-
term. Keynesian analysis can be applied to an economy in the short-
term, which in Europe typically has wage and price rigid_ity. 
The EMU introduced fiscal restraint to induce low inflation in the 
EMU area, theoretically based on medium or long-term 
macroeconomics, or FTPD. The fiscal restraint adopted is called the 
"The Stability and Growth Pact", which was agreed at the Dublin 
Summit in December 1996 and concluded at the Amsterdam 
European Council in June 1997. The Stability Pact prescribes 
sanctions for member states that breach the deficit ceiling. The 
Stability Pact was introduced to clarify and speed-up the excessive 
deficit procedure after EMU in order to strengthen the fiscal discipline. 
Also, the Stability Pact built quasi-automatic sanctions to penalize 
countries in excessive deficit. 
Sustaining the Stability Pact gives credibility to governments. 
Because discretion in fiscal policy is delegated to each government 
without the Fiscal Pact under the EMU, each government can decide 
to increase the deficit easily to accelerate inflation, to destabilize the 
EMU wide inflation. If this situation occurs, the public would not 
consider the government credible, resulting in expected high inflation. 
Therefore, The Stability Pact must resolve the credibility problem to 
avoid high inflation. 
The Stability Pact is effective in a short-term economy, and the de 
facto European economies with severe unemployment problems. In 
the long term, EU member states suffer unemployment problems, 
which are considered structural issues in the EU. The problem may be 
mitigated after transition to the EMU. Because the economic policies 
are restricted in the short or medium term along with the Amsterdam 
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Treaty, unemployment may grow the EMU. The Stability Pact is 
effective for European economies with severe unemployment 
problems. The problem may be mitigated after transition to the EMU. 
Because the economic policies are restricted in the short or medium 
term along with the Amsterdam Treaty, unemployment in the EMU 
may grow. We investigated labor market reform as a means of 
absorbing the shock. Calmfors (1998) studies the relationship 
between the labor reforms and the EMU, which suggests that 
monetary integration promotes labor reforms. Although we apply 
Calmfors'model, the relationship between labor reform and fiscal 
restraint or fiscal expenditure is explored using our model. 
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
shows the unemployment situation in Europe. The analytical 
framework is presented in Section 3, where we show the modified 
Barro-Gordon (1986) model. In Section 4, the labor market reform 
problems are discussed associated with fiscal problem in the EMU. 
Section 5 concludes, paying particular attention to the relevancy to 
policy design and labor market reform. 
2. The relationship between fiscal deficits and labor markets 
Most EU countries share a similar evolution of unemployment 
since the mid-1970s. When compared to the evolution of 
unemployment rates in the U.S. and Japan, the evolution of the 
average rate in EU countries is unique. Unemployment rates in the 
U.S. are cyclical around the 5 and 6% rate, while the rates in Japan 
have remained lower than those in the EU and U.S1. Unemployment 
rates in EU countries have increased from 2.5% in the early 1970s to 
above 10% in 1998 (Figure 2). 
While the average_ rate in the EU is higher, there is a lot of variety 
among countries (Figure 3). Figure 3 indicates the evolution of 
unemployment variation across the countries in the EU. The standard 
deviation of unemployment across EU countries remains stable at 
around 5% in all EU countries, or around 3% in EU countries 
excluding Ireland, Spain, and Portugal. The standard deviation of al 
1 However, the rates in Japan have been higher in recent years. 
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Figure 2 Unemployment Rates in EU countries 
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Figure 3 Variation in Unemployment Rates in European Union. 
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EU countries decreased from 1994 to 1998, while the deviation of 
countries excluding Ireland, Spain, Portugal remains unchanged. The 
evolution of unemployment rates across EU countries is heavily 
influenced by Ireland, Spain and Portugal. In particular, the Spanish 
unemployment rate has been approximately double that of the EU 
since the end of the 1980s, shooting up in 1992 and 1993 to heighten 
the average rates of EU-wide unemployment. From 1995, the Spanish 
unemployment rate has been declining to decrease the average rates, 
but the rates excluding those countries has been stable. In conclusion, 
the unemployment rates in many EU countries are not convergent. 
The countries in the EU can be grouped into three types by the 
unemployment rates in 1998. 
1. The low unemployment countries: the group can be defined as 
the countries whose rates are 7% or below. Luxembourg, 
Austria, the Netherlands, and Portugal are included. 
2. The mid unemployment countries: the group can be defined as 
the countries whose rates are between 7 and 13%. Germany, 
Great Britain, Sweden, Belgium, Denmark, Greece, France, Italy 
are included. 
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Figure 4 Unemployment rates and Inflation rates in the European Union, 
1986. Unemployment rates and inflation rates in 1997. 
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3. The high unemployment countries: the group can be defined as 
the countries whose rates are at 13% and above. Finland, 
Ireland and Spain are included in this group. 
Eleven countries in EU suffer from 7% unemployment rates and 
above, while there are significant differences in unemployment rates. 
On the other hand, inflation rates in EU countries are stable, as a 
result of the ERM between 1980 and 1998, and the movement toward 
monetary integration2. 
While the inflation rates were lower between the 1980s and 1990s 
in the EU, the unemployment rates on average were higher. A similar 
evolution of the inflation rates took place in the U.S. However, 
evolution of the unemployment rates is favorable. Japanese inflation 
rates were also stable in that era with lower unemployment rates. This 
suggests that the unemployment rate with stable inflation rate is 
higher in EU countries than in the United States or Japan. This 
situation might be caused by the stronger price and wage rigidities in 
Europe. Low inflation rates resulted in high unemployment rates in 
West European countries in those eras. 
Figure 4 shows the relationship in 1986 and 1997 between inflation 
rates and unemployment rates in EU member states 9 countries have 
low inflation rates below 4%, while 5 countries have the higher rates. 
At that time, Spain, Portugal and Austria did not participate in the 
ERM. The inflation rates of participants in the ERM were around 3%?. 
Unemployment rates in each country varied The Spanish 
unemployment rate was above 20%, German, Danish, Portuguese 
and Greek rates were around 8%. The Swedish rate about 3%. 
Excluding Greece, the member states had similarly stable inflation 
rates in 1997 although they had various unemployment rates, as 
mentioned above. The inflation rates converged to common rates 
because the Maastricht criteria require 3% inflation rates of countries 
that wishing to join the EMU. However, the situation of unemployment 
rates was different. The rates varied even after Stage 2 of the 
transition to EMU. From this figure, nominal terms were convergent 
because of the ERM and Maastricht criteria, but real terms were not 
2 For example, the Maastricht Treaty decided on the criteria, including low inflation rates. 
3 Although Austria did not enter the ERM, the inflation rates were low. 
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convergent4 as mentioned above. 
3. The Analytical Model 
This section examines .an economy with fiscal policy under the 
EMU. Monetary policy is conducted by the European Central Bank 
(ECB), and fiscal policy is conducted by the government in each 
member state. In this paper, the unemployment rate and inflation are 
assumed to be the policy target. The ECB and each member state's 
government maximize each object function independently, which 
includes the unemployment rate and the inflation rate. 
We assume that the unemployment rate for this country is 
determined by: 
u =u*ー /3(冗一冗e)+sg-mg, (1) 
where u * is the structural or equilibrium unemployment rate, 冗（が） is 
the (expected) inflation rate, the stochastic shock, 綬， andfiscal 
expenditure g. The first term of Equation (1) reflects a phenomenon of 
persistence in the European unemployment. In Europe, unemployment 
exhibits significant persistence. The literature provides various 
explanations for this phenomenon, including insider/output 
relationships5 and the adjustment cost approach互Thesetheories 
attribute the problem to persistent or structural inflexibility of labor 
markets in European countries. 
The second term denotes the output effect of surprise inflation. 
Barro-Gordon (1983) used the same type function as the output 
function. We apply the Barro-Gordon type function to the 
unemployment function. The coefficient f3 reflects the nominal wage 
rigidities, i.e., the greater the /3, the more surprise inflation reduces 
real wages. 
The third term denotes the output effect of fiscal policy. The term 
expresses the fact that, fiscal expenditure affects the unemployment 
4 Vinals and Jimeno (1998) also indicate geographical classification, core and peripheral countries, is not 
suitable for analyzing the convergence of the real and nominal term 
5 See Blanchard and Summers (1986), Lindbeck and Snower (1988). 
6 See Nickell (1986), Saint-Paul (1995). 
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rate in the short or medium term. Unemployment can depend on fiscal 
expenditure through the aggregate demand channel7, which. is the 
same as the standard Keynesian model. However, alternative effects 
of fiscal policy on unemployment can be considered. One effect is that 
fiscal expenditure stimulates aggregate demand, decreasing 
unemployment. Another effect is that expenditure heightens the real 
interest rates in the financial market, increasing unemployment rates 
through decrease of aggregate demand. Here, we postulate that the 
effect of fiscal policy is negative on the unemployment rate, that is, w 
is positive. 
The one period objective function of ECB is as follows, 
ぴ＝叶叫UA玉）2}, (2) 
where the EMU-wide average unemployment rate, uA=uニ/J(冗ーが）+μ 
-mg. The rate does not include the asymmetry shock u because the 
shocks cancel out each other in the procedure of summation. 
The ECB is guaranteed a high degree of independence from the 
member state's government 
The one period objective function of the government is as follows, 
が＝；｛凸au(u-;:;-)¥agが｝， (3) 
where the third term represents the cost of the government deficit 
collection or the political cost of increase of government debts. The 
budget constraint of the government is 
g + (fJ(d -d) = d + T, (4) 
7 See Jeanne (1997) as another example of the unemployment function, including the aggregate demand 
channel by the real interest rate. Also, Valila uses the output function including the effect of fiscal policy on 
the output. 
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where d denotes the deficit level, (f) (d -d) t—he penalty cost if the 
government exceeds the deficit level agreed by Treaty d. This restraint 
represents the penalty under the Stability Pact. We assume d = O for 
simplicity of calculation. 
Here, we investigate the discretionary policy of monetary and fiscal 
policy. The timing of events is assumed to be as follows. The wage 
setters form rational expectations for inflation first. The actual value of 
the stochastic shocks u andμare known second, the government 
determines the fiscal policy (fiscal deficits) third, and the monetary 
policy is determined by the ECB last. The problem can be solved 
backwards. Given rational inflationary expectations along with 
equilibrium unemployment, the ECB minimizes Equation (2) with 
respect to inflation under the constraint of (1). At the same time, the 
government minimizes Equation (3) with respect to the deficits under 
the constraint of (1) and (4). These procedures are interpreted as non-
cooperative behavior between the government and the ECB. The 
ECB is guaranteed by the Maastricht Treaty, which includes the 
political independence of the ECB from the political influence of each 
government as a provision. Therefore, their behavior is non-
cooperative. 
These minimizations yield the following actual values for the 
expected inflation rate, the actual inflation rate, the deficit, and the 
unemployment rate: 
-D * 
冗 e= (u-u) 
1+~' 
冗＝ーJい(u*-u)+μ}+J3u,
d=-J4{J1(u二u)+μ}+J心l
u={I+w(I-り)JI-¼ —f3G}u二 {w(I-叫-¼吼G}u
+{PJ2―w(I-り)-¼+ 1 }μ+ { 1-/3J 3-OJ (1 -(fJ) J5 } u'
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
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where the various coefficients above are as follows; 
(1 + 20u炉） a戸佑炉(1-り)2 D E0,』
JI三 >0'J2 三—< 0, J3三>0' 
l+A A A 
w(l —りF (1 + 0 u /J)(l-(f)) auのJ 4三 A < 0'Js三 A > 0' 
A三 (1+ 0u炉）ag+ a五(1-cp) 2> 0, D 三—pa瓜<0, E = ag十屈au(lーが
F三バい(1-p)-l}<O,G 三 (1:~)!i(1- p滋閃J.
The coefficient of F is supposed to be negative because the ECB has 
a small weighting for the unemployment rate. 
The usual inflation bias of discretionary monetary policy arises. 
Inflation increases with the equilibrium unemployment, that is, the 
inflation bias of the monetary policy arises, which increases with 
equilibrium unemployment as with the result of the Barro-Gordon 
Model. 
The sensitivity of the equilibrium unemployment to expected and 
actual inflation depends on the preferences of the government and 
the ECB (au, ag, 仇）， theeffect of fiscal policy on unemployment (m), 
and the effect of inflation on unemployment (/3). If, for example, 仇 or
the strictest target for the inflation of the ECB, is zero, the expected 
and actual inflation rates is also zero. This case is interpreted as the 
politically perfect independence of the ECB from the EU commission 
and from each government. The Maastricht Treaty decides on this 
guarantee for the ECB. However, the commission might affect the 
ECB in future, that is, 仇rises,which causes inflation. The ECB carries 
out loose monetary policy for unemployment. If au increases, inflation 
also increases because the coefficient of asymmetry shock becomes 
larger. If the government raises the weight of unemployment, the 
expenditure grows, to raise inflation. 
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Table 1 The results of the parameters of preference to economic variables. 
冗 d u 
μ V μ V μ V 
0u ＋ ＋ ？ ？ ？ 
au ＋ ＋ ？ ？ ？ 
ag ？ ？ ＋ ＋ 
り ？ ？ ？ ？ 
If, on the other hand, ag increases, the government decreases the 
expenditure for the unemployment rate to increase, and also for the 
inflation rate to decline. 
The government deficit also depends on the preference of the 
government and the ECB (au, ag, 仇）， theeffect of fiscal policy on 
unemployment (m), and the effect of inflation on unemployment (/3). In 
particular, OJ crucially influences the fluctuation of the deficit. If, OJ is 
positive, common shock increases the deficit through expanding the 
fiscal expenditure. If OJ is negative, common shock decreases the 
deficit through contracting fiscal expenditures because fiscal 
expansion increases unemployment by raising the real interest rate互
Also as to country-specific shock, OJ is an important factor. The deficit 
increases if OJ is positive because fiscal expenditure decreases 
unemployment to improve the loss function. The deficit decreases if OJ 
is negative because fiscal contraction decreases unemployment to 
improve the loss function. 
On the other hand, the actual unemployment rate deviates from 
the equilibrium unemployment rate (structural unemployment rate) by 
that of common shock and / or country-specific shock, which are 
accommodated. Absorption of common shock by both policies 
depends on the sign and value of OJ. If OJ is positive, the shock is not 
absorbed perfectly to increase the influence. Also, absorption of 
country-specific shock by both policies depends on the sign and value 
of OJ. If OJ is negative, the shock is not absorbed perfectly, to increase 
the influence. 
Next, the effect of the Stability Pact on inflation and unemployment 
8 This process is not described explicitly in our model. However, we test the coefficient in the previous 
section. 
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is considered as follows. In this paper, increase of (f) represents the 
fiscal restraint, or the Stability Pact. If (f) increases, the expected 
inflation declines under the condition that the inertia of unemployment 
is relatively strong, or 1 -p > O. If (f) increases, the deviation of actual 
inflation by common shock (μ) becomes smaller under the condition 
that the inertia of the unemployment rate is relatively strong. Also, the 
deviation of actual inflation by country-specific shock (u) becomes 
larger if (f) increases. Because the Stability Pact imposes a restraint on 
fiscal policy as the shock absorber of the shock, unemployment 
worsens. Therefore, the ECB reacts to this unemployment situation 
through monetary policy if the ECB targets unemployment. 
If (f) increases in the same way, variation of the deficit by the 
positive common shock(μ) is ambiguous. The fiscal policy is so more 
restrained that the policy cannot absorb the shock, while contracted 
monetary policy is executed for the shock. This results in decrease of 
relative loss for the deficit in the object function, to increase the deficit. 
The restraint also induces the decrease of deficit. 
Variation of the government deficit and inflation by country-specific 
shock (u) becomes smaller by the increase of (f), because fiscal restraint 
imposes a discretionary response to u, while the monetary policy is 
executed for the shock, to increase the deficit partially for the same 
reason mentioned above. 
The effect of the Stability Pact on the unemployment rate is 
ambiguous. The increase of the penalty of the Stability Pact induces 
the lower amount of fiscal policy for both shocks. If the amount causes 
high unemployment, monetary policy is applied for partial 
compensation of the shocks. If the amount causes lower 
unemployment, monetary policy with a low inflation target is supported 
by the Stability Pact. 
Restrictive demand management such as the Stability Pact is an 
important factor in stabilizing the macroeconomy. It is often motivated 
to bring down inflation, limit budget deficits, and support a fixed 
exchange rate, such as the ERM and the common currency policy, 
such as the EMU. The Stability Pact was introduced to sustain a 
common monetary policy in the EMU through restrictive demand 
management. If the country has a positive effect of the government 
deficit on the unemployment rate, the Stability Pact is consistent with 
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the employment situation. 
4. Macroeconomic effects of the labor market reform in the EMU 
Labor market institutions and other factors determine the high 
unemployment problems in Western Europe. It should be possible to 
reduce the high employment in Western Europe through labor market 
reform. 
The difference in unemployment performance between the United 
States and Western Europe is further caused by the functioning of the 
labor market. Some researches focus on this problem. For example, 
some 40-50% of the unemployed in Western Europe have been 
unemployed for more than one year, while only about 10% in the 
United States have been unemployed for more than one year9. The 
outward outflow from the unemployment pool is smaller in Western 
Europe than in the United States. The reasons for this are as follows叫
1) Labor market institutions 
2) Government regulations 
3) Various welfare-state arrangements 
These result in high equilibrium unemployment, which is affected by 
exogenous factors, for example, labor market institutions and 
government regulation. 
There is another problem regarding unemployment in Western 
Europe. Persistent unemployment in Western Europe is affected by 
endogenous variables, as explained below. 
1) Rigid real and relative wages and labor turnover costs 
2) Difficulty of job search, discouraged workers due to various benefit 
systems 
3) Social norms 
The extent to which labor market reform to reduce equilibrium 
9 See OECD {194). 
10 These are cited from Lindbeck {196). 
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unemployment and the persistence of unemployment are undertaken 
concerns the political economy. Bean (1998) argues that reform is not 
acceptable until the escape route of depreciating the currency is 
definitely closed. Although monetary policy and labor market reforms 
are not a substitute, the incentive for reform will be stronger. Calmfors 
(1998) and Siebert and Sutherland (1997) have developed analysis 
based on the. Barro-Gordon model under discretionary monetary 
policy. Labor reforms will be promoted because monetary policy is no 
longer the measure of stabilization for country-specific shocks. 
Indeed, there is another measure, fiscal policy stabilizing the shocks. 
However, the effect of fiscal policy is limited by the Stability Pact , as 
mentioned above. Policymakers will consider labor market reform as 
a stabilization measure for specific shocks. 
If a member state in the EMU faces country-specific or EMU-wide 
common shocks, the government has an incentive to reform the labor 
market, for example, by reducing unemployment benefits, or barriers 
for the unemployed to enter the labor market. 
This section expands the model in the previous section to 
investigate the effect of labor reform on inflation and unemployment. 
Equilibrium unemployment is assumed to depend negatively on the 
amount of reform, so that 
* -u =u―¢Jr, (9) 
where i denotes the equilibrium unemployment rate in the absence of 
reform, r the amount of labor reform. Furthermore, u* > iis assumed. 
The labor market reforms include a reduction of the wage rigidities, an 
increase in flexibility in the labor market, furthermore, a reduction of 
unemployment benefits and deregulation of labor markets. As a result 
of the labor market reform, the unemployment rate is assumed to 
decrease because greater flexibility in the labor market induces new 
employees to enter the labor market more easily. 
The government determines the amount of labor reform by 
minimization of the following loss function before wage setters form 
the expectation for inflation. 
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び＝り三(u-;-)'+egが+cr2}, (10) 
where the first, second and third terms is the same as in the previous 
loss function of the government, Equation (3). The fourth term 
represents the cost of labor market reform. In general, labor market 
reform is costly because there is political conflict between the 
government and employees who have vested interests. For example, 
the introduction of market flexibility by the government infringes the 
vested interest of employees who have entered the labor market. 
Therefore, they object to this policy politically. The coefficient c 
represents this situation. 
First, the government determines the amounts of labor market 
reforms. Second, wage setters form the expectation of inflation. Third, 
a country-specific shock and/or a common shock are recognized by 
the authorities. Next, the government determines the fiscal policy to 
stabilize common and specific shocks, and the ECB determines the 
monetary policy to stabilize the common shock simultaneously. 
Minimization of (10) subject to (1), (4) and (9) by the government, 
and minimization of (2) subject to (1) and (9) by the ECB yield the 
following equilibrium amount of labor reform, 
r=入1(u-u)+A2μ+A3U, (11) 
where the coefficients are denoted as follows; 
入1三
ぶ(J2+<f>aエ）+aぷ JI(J2+ agJ/)王 kふ， 入2 三
¢(J/(J2+ <f>agJ/) +auK/) +c </> (J/(J2+<j>a gJ/)+auK/) +c' 
入
-Jl(J3 +agJ4Js)+auKIK3 
3 三
</> (J/(Jけ巳J/)+aぶ）+c 
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K1 =l-j3G+m(l―叫Ji,K2 =J1 +m(lーりJ.,K3三 I-0"~2 E -m(I叫 Jぶ
The amount of reform is chosen so that the sum of the gain from 
lower unemployment (the first term in (11)), of the gain from reduction 
of the variation in unemployment by the common shock (the second 
term) and by the country-specific shock (the third term) are 
maximized. The more the amount of labor reform increase, the more 
the unemployment rate declines. Because the labor reforms are 
supposed to improve structural unemployment in the EMU, the actual 
unemployment rates decline. 
The inflation rate and the unemployment rate are also decided as 
follows; 
冗=J1J2 (</Jl1 -1) (u -i) +Ji(J1</Jiし2-1)μ+ (J1J2</JA3 + J3) U, (12) 
u =J1J4(¢11 -1)(u -u)+~(J1<fJ入2 -1)μ+ (JIJ4 </JA3 +JS) 1), (13) 
When the coefficient of Equation (12) is compared with that of (6) 
as to common shockμ, the absolute value of the coefficient of 
Equation (12) is lower than that of (6). This means labor market 
reforms contribute to lower inflation by common shock if the sign of D 
is negative, that is, J2 is negative. The negative D means that the 
effect of fiscal policy on the unemployment rate is smaller. If D _is 
positive, that is, the effect of fiscal policy is larger, the influence of the 
shock on inflation is negative. The labor reforms increase the inflation. 
Therefore, the reforms contribute to minimizing the variance of 
inflation caused by a common shock. In the same way, the absolute 
value of the coefficient of the country-specific shock in (12) is lower 
than that of (6). This means labor market reforms contribute to 
minimizing the variance of inflation caused by country-specific shock. 
The absolute value of the coefficient of Equation (13) is lower than 
that of (7). This means that labor market reforms contribute to lower 
government deficit caused by common shock. The reforms contribute 
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to minimizing the variance of deficit caused by a common shock. Also, 
the absolute value of the coefficient of the country-specific shock in 
(12) is lower than that of (6). This that means labor market reforms 
contribute to minimizing the variance of deficit caused by country-
specific shock. 
The above-mentioned findings suggest that the labor reforms are 
effective measures for sustaining inflation and government deficit in 
member's states. Decline of structural (or equilibrium) unemployment 
caused by the labor reforms lightens the burden imposed on the 
monetary and fiscal policy, to improve unemployment, inflation and 
the government deficit. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper examines the monetary policy of the ECB and fiscal 
constraint under the EMU. If the countries participating in the EMU do 
not constitute an optimal currency area, macroeconomic performance 
in the EMU would be seriously affected by symmetric and asymmetric 
shocks. Also, the European countries have serious unemployment 
problems induced by labor market institutions and unemployment 
benefits, etc. Therefore, the authorities pursue economic stabilization 
EMU wide and in each country through economic policies. The 
monetary policy of the ECB is implemented through minimizing the 
loss function including just symmetric shock. The fiscal policy of the 
government is implemented through minimizing the loss function 
including both asymmetric and symmetric shocks. This paper 
investigates the effect of the policy on inflation and the unemployment 
rate, which depends on surprise inflation and fiscal policy. Both 
monetary policy and fiscal policy can absorb shocks to stabilize the 
economy. 
In fact, fiscal restraint or the Stability Pact is introduced in the 
EMU, which is effective against inflation and fiscal deficits. However, 
the stabilization effects of the fiscal policy are decreased, which 
results in the fiscal policy absorbing litle shocks. If rigid constraint is 
practiced, economies in the EMU might become unstable. 
In order to support fiscal restraint, labor market reforms are 
effective against the shocks. This paper also suggests that labor 
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reform is needed on the decline of the structural unemployment 
problems, to decrease inflation and government deficits. The reforms 
are difficult to achieve in Europe because political pressures and 
conflicts can occur in any country. However, labor market problems 
are key factors in achieving successful monetary union. 
Appendix 1 
We obtain the signs of the effects of the changes of preferences to 
each coefficient in SOection 3 as follows. 
8JI 8J2 =a gfJ2{ 2 + 2ag+a uw2 (1-<p2) }>0, =-ag fJ{ag +a uw2(l-<p2) }<0, 
吼 随 U
詈aufJw(lーq,)2{a. +auw2 (1—炉）｝，誓aJJw(l叫{a.+auw2(1 —炉）｝，
8J5 
紐 u
=au/Jw(l-<p){ (1-fJ)a g+a uw2 (l-<p2)} BJ1 = w2 (1-<p) 2(1-0u/J), 
'aa u 
8J2 8J3 ―-= /Jag 0uw2(1 -げ>0, =w2(1-り)20u/Jag(1 + 0u/J 2) > 0,al aau 
aJ4 =agm(I-rp){0ufl (1-/J)-1 }(1 +t/32), 凸=agm(I-rp)(1 + 0ufl)(I+ 0u/J 2), 
aau aau 
aJI 
aa g 
=—(1 +0ufJ2){(1 +2~/J 2)ag+aum2(1-{f))2 }< 0, 
8J2 8J3 = -0uf3auか(1-り）又0, =-Eい(1+0u/J 2)< 0, 
aa g aa g 
8J4 8J5 
aa 
= -m(I-{f))F(1 +0u/J2), =一のau(1 -{fJ) (1 + 0 u /J2)(1+ 0 u /J) .
g aa g 
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8JI 8J2 ―-= 2a.um2゜ u/J丸(1-り)> 0, ー —= -D2a.u厨 (1-(fJ)> 0, 
函J aり
8J3 8J4 ＝ー 2a.um20uf3a./1-(f))(E + L1)< 0, = mF{ aum2 (1-(fJ)2-(1 + 0u /32) a.g }, 
砂 砂
— =aum(l+0uf3){ aum2(l-(f))2-(I+0uf32) ag}. 
8J5 
函）
Appendix 2 Estimation results of the effects of the deficits on 
unemployment rates and inflation 
Table A 1 Estimation results of unemployment rates in the EMU 
Germany France Italy Belgium 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
C -2 420946 -1 235775 3.258992 2 253525 9.503448 2 315325 2 195224 0.999541 
(unemployment 1.249118 5 179922 0.609015 3 999552 0.27833 0 871992 0.829763 5.277246 
rates)_1 
(inflation rates) -1 -0.016528 -0 091953 -0.150684 -0 778861 0.008153 0 043179 0.029486 0 174506 
(fiscal surplus}_1 -0.340052 -2 589606 -0.413654 -2 492838 0.128168 1 177217 0.023467 0 219266 
Adjusted R-squared 0.748683 0.736763 0 011736 0.671089 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.891112 2 113744 1 768278 0 573053 
Ireland Netherlands Portugal Spain 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
C 7.797214 1 695849 2.522712 1 543117 0.179698 0.136855 7.372915 1.723079 
(unemployment 0.50136 1.855054 0 779902 4 340819 0 836589 5 291396 0.641621 3.274984 
rates)_1 
(inflation rates) -1 0.029741 0.077857 -0.279804 -0 558526 -0.037952 -0 299572 -0.309269 -0.538784 
(fiscal surplus)_1 -0.197805 -1.615299 0 306673 0 915196 -0.187028 -1 338199 0.000411 0.001032 
Adjusted R-squared 0.380268 0.771694 0.707756 0.433728 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.704555 1.582063 1.238815 0.806553 
United Kingdom Finland 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
C 5.305909 1 758371 6.196893 1.4842 
(unemployment o.237489 a 584246 0 4771 1 346434 
rates) -1
(inflation rates) -1 -0.401258 -1 334697 -1.421629 -2 052021 
(fiscal surplus)_1 -0.163808 -0 424372 -1.024362 -1 135349 
Adjusted R-squared 0.209959 0 862343 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.092995 0.521882 
Notes) 1. Unemployment rates are from Eurostat, OECD Main Economic Indicators, inflation rates from IMF IFS, and 
structural fiscal balances from OECD Economic Outlook 
2. The estimation period is from 1983 to 1998, excluding the United Kingdom from 1988 to 1998. 
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We estimated the effects of the government deficits on 
unemployment rates in countries in EU using a simple structural 
model. Fiscal policy shifts the aggregate demand curve to decrease 
unemployment rates, but the policy increases the rates of interest to 
decrease the aggregate demand. We measure the change of stance 
of the fiscal policy as budget surplus, which is equal to the change of 
government debts. The estimation period is from the 1983 to 1997 for 
the ten countries (Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Ireland, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom, and Finland) in the 
EMU. 
Allowing for some inertia in both relationships with one period lag八
we obtain the reduced form for unemployment rates as shown in Table 
1. In al countries, the coefficients of inertia of lagged unemployment 
are significant, which shows the strong inertia effect in EU countries. It 
is caused by the characteristics of labor markets in Western Europe, 
i.e. the wage rigidity, unemployment benefits, etc. 
The effects of inflation on unemployment are negative excluding 
the case of Belgium, Italy and Ireland. In particular, the coefficient of 
Italy is significantly positive. The case of a negative coefficient means 
that declines of inflation cause an decrease of unemployment. The 
case of a positive coefficient means declines of inflation cause a 
decrease of unemployment. The former is consistent with the standard 
Phillips curves. 
The coefficient on the fiscal surplus shows the impacts of the 
budget on the unemployment in each country. The effects of fiscal 
stance in each country are various. The signs of unemployment in 
Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Spain are positive, but no country has 
a significant coefficient The signs of Germany, France, Ireland, 
Portugal, and the United Kingdom, Finland are negative. In particular, 
the coefficients of Germany・and France are significant due to the 
probability of 10%. 
From these results, both positive and negative signs of fiscal 
surplus to unemployment rate are possible although the coefficients 
might be insignificant. The signs are not determined ad hoc. Below, 
11 Determination of lag is based on Akaike criteria. Some countries are not suitable for the two period lag, 
but we applied two period lag to al countries finally. 
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we analyze the theoretical examination of monetary policy and fiscal 
policy in order to obtain more general insights into the policy effects, 
supposing the unemployment function with these results of the effects 
of fiscal surplus on unemployment rates. 
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